Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2

Article 6

2-1-1950

Recent Decisions
John F. Mendoza
William J. Verdonk
William G. Greif
James L. O'Brien

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John F. Mendoza, William J. Verdonk, William G. Greif & James L. O'Brien, Recent Decisions, 25 Notre Dame L. Rev. 353 (1950).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol25/iss2/6

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
must stay within his bounds and not hold himself out as qualified to
render legal advice, or act in any manner which would have a tendency
to destroy the attorney-client relationship. On the other hand, the
normal conduct of a legitimate business incidentally involving matters
which, standing .alone, would constitute the practice of law, is not of
itself sufficient to render such conduct objectionable.
James W. Oberfell

RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-PROCEDURAL DUE PRoCESs-THE RIGHT OF

ARGUMNT.-Federal Communications Commission v. WJR,
The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U. S. 265, 69 S. Ct. 1097 (1949). On
August 22, 1946, the Federal Communications Commission granted,
without notice or hearing, the application of the Coastal Plains Broadcasting Company for a construction permit to erect a new secondarytype broadcasting station in North Carolina. This permit specified
that the new station was to broadcast on the same frequency which
previously had been used exclusively by Station WJR, which is located
in Detroit. WJR then filed a petition with the commission for reconsideration and hearing of the commission's decision of August 22,
1946. Shortly thereafter, Coastal Plains filed with the commission an
opposition, legally regarded as a demurrer or a motion to dismiss. This
opposition raised the question whether the allegation in the petition
stated objectionable interference to WJR's protected zone. The petition of WJR was denied without hearing on the grounds that on the
facts alleged, there was no interference within the normally protected contours as specified by commission regulation. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 174 F. (2.d)
226, 233 (D. C. Cir. 1948), it was held:
ORAi,

. . . due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, re-

quires a hearing, including an opportunity to make oral argument,
on every question of law raised before a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, including questions raised by demurrer or as if on demurrer, except such questions of law as may be involved in interlocutory orders
such as orders for the stay of proceedings pendente lite, for temporary
injunctions and -thelike.

Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States on
the commission's appeal. The Court held that due process of law, as
conceived by the Fifth Amendment, does not require oral argument
upon every question of law arising in administrative proceedings of
every sort.
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The important issue, as pointed out by the Court, was the extent to
whic4 due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, requires federal administrative tribunals to accord the right of oral
argument to one claiming to be adversely affected by their action,
particularly in regard to questions of law. Before an answer can be
given to this question, the nature of procedural due process must first
be examined.
The test of whether procedural due process has been accorded is
whether an administrative agency, in its procedure, as distinguished
from the effects of its order upon substantial rights, has succeeded in
satisfying the requirements of the Federal Constitution. Railroad
Commission of Calif. et al. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S
388, 58 S. Ct. 334, 82 L. Ed. 319 (1938). In Ohio Bell Telephone
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 301 U. S. 292, 57 S. Ct. 724, 81
L. Ed. 1093 (1937), the Court declared that the right to a fair and
open hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play assured to every
litigant by the Federal Constitution as a minimal requirement. The
requirements of due process have been deemed satisfied if one has had
reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present one's claim and defense, due regard being had to the nature of
the proceedings and the character of the rights which may be affected
by it. Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North et al., 271 U. S. 40, 60 S. Ct
437, 70 L. Ed. 656 -(1926). In National Labor Relations Board v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 351, 58 S. Ct. 904,
82 L. Ed. 1381 (1938), it was stated that: "The Fifth Amendment
guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial
rights."
The case principally relied upon for upholding the right of oral argument before administrative tribunals is that of Londoner v. Denver,
210 U. S. 373, 386, 28 S. Ct. 708, 52 L. Ed. 1103 (1908). In that
case the city council assessed a tax for the cost of paving a street upon
which the lands of the plaintiff abutted. The plaintiff appealed on the
grounds that he was not accorded an opportunity to be heard by the
city council before the enactment of the assessment ordinance. The
Supreme Court in this case held that even though an opportunity was
given to submit in writing all objections:
* . . something more than that, even in proceedings for taxation, is
required by due process of law . . . even here a hearing, in its very
essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to
support his allegations by argument, however brief. ...

In Erie Railroad Co. v. Mayor and Alderman, 79 N. J. L. 512, 76 At.
1065 (1910), the court, following the Londoner case, confirmed the
plaintiff's right of oral argument. In this case the defendants had instituted proceedings with a view to the construction of a street over
the lands of the plaintiff.
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The courts have recognized three limitations upon the right of oral
argument. These are: (1) the number of persons concerned; (2)
cases in which the agency has the alternative of granting oral arguments; (3) agenicy procedure.
The first limitation, for eiample, was imposed in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization et al., 239 U. S. 441, 445,
36 S. Ct. 141, 60 L. Ed. 372 (1915). Mr. Justice Holmes in delivering this opinion said:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a fsw people, it is
impractical that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption
... There must be a limit to individual argument if government is to
go on.

The Court distinguished the Londoner case on the ground that the
relatively small number of persons concerned were exceptionally affected in that case. The net effect of this decision was to require the
trial technique in the Londoner case but not to require it in the second
case. Other courts, following the "number of persons" doctrine, have
applied it as a partial or sole criterion. Common Council of City of
Watertown v. Deft of Finance, 59 S. D. 573, 241 N. W. 731 (1932);
Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500, 215 Pac. 257 (1923).
The second limitation was an outgrowth of the Morgan cases, infra.
It has been held that these decisions explicitly granted the right of
oral argument, although in actuality they seemed to do no more than
make it an alternative for the administrative agency to decide. As
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes stated in Morgan v. United States, 298 U.
S. 468, 481, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 L. Ed. 1288 (1936): "The one who decides must hear . . .Argument may be oral or written.

The require-

ments are not technical. But there must be a hearing in a substantial
sense."
Again in Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S.1, 18, 58 S.Ct. 999, 82
L. Ed. 1129 (1938), Hughes said:
The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise it is a barren one.

The Supreme Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 60 S. Ct. 437, 84 L. Ed. 656
(1939), decided that questions of procedure, in ascertaining the public
interest, were explicitly and by implication left by the legislature to
the commission's own devising, so long as it observed the fundamental
requirements for the protection of private as well as public interests.
Following this "alternative rights theory," the Court has held that
written statements of revenues and other expenses would meet the
requirements of a lawful hearing. San Diego Land & Town Co. v.
National City, 174 U. S.739, 19 S. Ct. 804, 43 L. Ed. 1154 (1899).
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The final limitation is imposed by the agencies of government
through their procedural rules. They have wisely established these
rules in order to protect individual as well as the public interests. The
general rule requires that the plaintiff request oral argument. Under
these circumstances, if the party fails to request it, he can not be
heard later to complain that the opportunity was denied. Tri-State
BroadcastingCo. v. Federal Communications Commission, 107 F. (2d)
956 (D. C. Cir. 1939). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
FED. R. Civ. P. 78, the courts, in order to expedite their business, may
make provisions by rule for the submission of motions without oral
hearing, upon brief, written statements of reasons in support and opposition. It must be noted that, because of the very nature of administrative agencies, their procedural rules will not conform to common law trial techniques. In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield
Steel & Iron Co., 295 Fed. 53 (D. C. Cir. 1923), aff'd., 269 U. S. 217,
46 S. Ct. 73, 70 L. Ed. 242 (1925), it was held that since the Interstate Commerce Commission is an administrative body, the validity
of its proceedings is not dependent upon compliance with procedural
rules of the courts of law. The agency may conduct its proceedings
in such a manner as will best be conducive to the proper dispatch of
business and to the ends of justice.
The instant case would seem to belong most properly in the category
of the third limitation. The Court decided that since no particular
form of procedure is required to satisfy due process under the Fifth
Amendment, the parties litigant must look to the Communications Act,
48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1946), for protection of the right of oral argument. Since the Act provides that oral
argument will be accorded in a single situation only, namely, in proceedings heard initially before an examiner under section 409(a), the
Court concluded that the commission would have the discretion of
allowing it in other instances. It is interesting to note that the Court
of Appeals has, since the decision in the WIR case, construed sections
312(b) and 154(j) of the Act, which were also relied on by the
appellees in the principal case. Sections 312(b) and 154(j), providing for "reasonable opportunity to show cause," and that "Any
party may appear before the commission and be heard in person or by
attorney," were held to require no more than consideration of written
briefs. American Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, -.--.F. (2d)-.... (D. C. Cir. 1949).
As the preceding cases have shown, the Court of Appeals' broad extension, in its consideration of the instant case, of the right of oral
argument, as opposed to the rule announced by the Supreme Court in
reversipg this decision, has never been given general recognition by
the courts. It must be noted that the majority of the cases which
recognize a broad right of oral argument are those which interpret the
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Fourteenth Amendment in relation to city ordinances and state statutes.
The principal question as to state procedure raised in the federal
courts is whether procedural due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution has been satisfied. See 1 Vom
BAuR, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 322 (1942).
The principal case has already been cited in American Broadcasting
Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, supra, which extends the
rule in the principal case to apply to questions of fact. This would
seem to be a reasonable extension, since the Due Process Clause does
not distinguish between questions of law and questions of fact. L. B.
Wilson, Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission, 170 F. (2d) 793
(D. C. Cir. 1948). In refusing the opportunity of oral argument, however, the court in the American Broadcasting Co. case reminded the
commission that this does not relieve them from the duty of granting
a fair hearing. The court stated, 3 PIx & FIcaER AD. LAW (Decisions) § 4 Id. 12-101, 109 (1945):
While the decision of the Supreme Court in the WJR case held, as
above pointed out, that the Commission may act upon written submission,
i.e., without oral argument, we do not understand the ambit of that decision to be so broad as to relieve the Commission from the duty of receiving evidence and of making findings of both the basic or underlying
and the ultimate facts before it decides an issue of fact presented by a
petition and an opposition thereto.

This decision should give notice to the commission that the vigilance
of the courts will disallow injurious experimentation with a party's
rights.
The Court in the instant case proceeded on the theory that the
right of oral argument should be decided on a case-to-case basis, taking into consideration the differences in the particular interests affected,
the circumstances involved, and the procedures prescribed by Congress for dealing with them. In Davis, The Opportunity to be Heard
in the Administrative Process, 51 YALE L. J. 1093 (1942), the author
asserts that the problem can be solved by discovering the best
practical means to assure enlightened administrative action. Among
the means by which private interests can be protected are: interviews, conferences, collaboration between agency representatives and
private representatives in drafting rules, and reception of written evidence andargument. Although the parties must look to the courts
for a final determination and protection of their rights, the aforementioned methods will be valuable in achieving this end.
John F. Mendoza
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BILLS AND NOTESSALES CONTRACT

Is

NEGOTIABILITY OF NOTE WHEN CONDITIONAL
ATTACHED

BY

PERFORATION-KNOWLEDGE

OF

Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works et al.. ....Cal. App..... 208 P. (2d) 780 (1949).
The Orange County Machine Works arranged for the purchase of a mechanical press from the General American Precooling Corporation
through a dealer, the Ermac Company, by means of a conditional sales
contfact with the dealer obligating the dealer to transfer title when the
purchase prince was paid. Attached to the contract, and separated from
it only by a perforated line, was a note which the contract recited was
to be negotiable "apart from this contract, even though at the time of
execution it may be temporarily attached hereto by perforation or
otherwise." The dealer assigned this contract and endorsed and delivered the attached note to the appellant, a finance company, and received in payment a check which it deposited to its account. The
dealer then drew its own check to the order of the owner which was
dishonored upon presentment for payment. Accordingly, the manufacturer retained possession of the press. The finance company severed
the note from the conditional sales contract and brought this action on
the note as a holder in due course. The trial court held that the
I
finance company
was not a holder in due course upon a finding that
the finance company was aware at the time of negotiation that the
Ermac Company was not the owner of the press which it agreed to
deliver, and that no delivery of the press had been made.
The court in the instant case, in rejecting this argument, construed
the conditional sales contract to be nothing more than a promise to
convey when the purchase price had been paid. Thus the court held
that knowledge of the executory nature of the contract did not prevent
the finance company from becoming a holder in due course, if the
instrument was negotiable in character.
The appellee also attacked the negotiable character of the instrument,
contending that the fact that the contract was attached to the instrument at the time of negotiation rendered the promise to pay conditional. The court, in holding that the negotiability of the note was
not impaired by its transfer with the conditional sales contract as part
of one transaction, adhered to the prevalent view that assignment of a
contract under such circumstances does not render the accompanying
note non-negotiable.
While, as the court states, there were no cases in California which
had passed on this point directly, there are a few cases on related
matters that are of interest in a consideration of this problem. California seems to have held, at least before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1917, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3082 et seq. (1949).
that the recital in a note that the note is secured by a mortgage renders the note non-negotiable, when the note and the mortgage were
FAILuRE OF CONsIDERATION.-Commercial
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created in the same transaction. National-Hardwoodv. Sherwood, 165
Cal. 1, 130 Pac. 881 (1913); Helmer v. Parsons et al., 18 Cal. App.
450, 123 Pac. 356 (1912). This holding seems, however, to stem from
the fact that mere notice of the existence of the mortgage was considered sufficient to destroy negotiability. Thus it was held that a
note that did not recite the existence of a mortgage was nonetheless
"non-negotiable" in the hands of a purchaser who took with notice,
when the note and the mortgage were executed as part of one transaction. Metropolis Trust & Savings Bank v. Monnier, 169 Cal. 592,
147 Pac. 265 (1915). However, the fact that the note and mortgage
were executed as part of one transaction has been held essential to the
impairment of the negotiability of the note, even when the holder of
the note was also the assignee of the mortgage. Pitman v. Walker, 187
Cal. 667, 203 Pac. 739 (1922). In a more recent case, Williams v.
Silverstein, 213 Cal. 269, 2 P. (2d) 165 (1931), it was held that the
mere fact that a note was executed with an escrow agreement as part
of the same transaction did not render the note non-negotiable; but
it is perhaps important to note that the terms of the escrow agreement
were held not to have conditioned the promise to pay. The confused
conception of negotiability in all these cases makes understandable the
confession of the court in the instant case of its inability to find
"... any cases in California helpful in determining this problem."
The rule adopted by the California court in the principal case is,
however, in direct contradiction with that laid down by the Supreme
Court of Nebraska. Nebraska adopted without alteration the Negotiable Instruments Law rule, NEGOTIALE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 3, that
mere reference to collateral security will not destroy negotiability.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 62-103 (1943). Where, however, a conditional sales
contract and a note were printed on the same sheet of paper and the
paper was later divided into two parts, the Nebraska court held that the
purchaser, who did the dividing, was charged with knowledge of the
terms of the contract, and thus subject to personal defenses. Van Nordheim v. Cornelius et al., 129 Neb. 719, 262 N. W. 832 (1935).
It is evident from an examination of the Nebraska decision that the
court relied heavily on the case of Roblee et al. v. Union Stockyards
Nat. Bank, 69 Neb. 180, 95 N. W. 61 (1903). An analysis of the
Roblee case reveals a distinguishing feature in that there, not a conditional sales contract, but a mortgage was involved, the terms of which
required payment of uncertain sums at uncertain times before maturity. The uncertainty of payment and the uncertainty of the time of
payment were held referable to the note, thus impairing its negotiability.
The Roblee case appears to be on no less precarious grounds for the
reason that the court there relied on Lincoln kVational Bank v. Perry
et al., 66 Fed. 887 (8th Cir. 1895), which held that a note, which bac
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an agreement embodied within it rendering the amount payable at
maturity uncertain, was non-negotiable. The disparity between the
Perry case and the Nebraska case is even greater than that between
Roblee et al. v. Union Stockyards Nat. Bank, supra, and Van Nordheim v. Cornelius et al., supra. In the Perry case, there was no conditional sales contract or note complete on its face, but there was instead a single instrument containing a contract and a promise to pay
an uncertain amount. The substantiating effect of the Perry case is
further weakened by Kobey v. Hoffman et al., 229 Fed. 486 (8th Cir.
1916), in which it was said that the Perry decision apparently overlooked the rule in Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchant's Nat.
Bank, 136 U. S. 268, 10 S. Ct. 999, 34 L. Ed. 349 (1890), holding
that a clause affecting the time and amount of payment similar to that
found in the Perry case does not destroy the negotiability of a promissory note.
The decision of the Nebraska court is, however, representative of
several jurisdictions. Commercial Credit Co. -v. Child, 199 Ark. 1073,
137 S.W. (2d) 260, 128 A. L. R. 726 (1940); Finance Co. of the South
v. Jones, 13 Ga. App. 94, 125 S. E. 510 (1924); State Nat. Bank v.
Cantrell, 47 N. M. 389, 143 P. (2d) 592, 152 A. L. R. 1216 (1943).
A number of other jurisdictions, including Iowa, McKnight v. Parsons,
136 Iowa 390, 113 N. W. 858 (1907), and Michigan, Shattuck et al.
v. Reed, 221 Mich. 155, 190 N. W. 649 (1922), take a contrary view.
In Alabama it has been held that the negotiability of an instrument
is not affected by a provision describing the property and reserving
title in the seller. As the court stated:
It is axiomatic, of course, that such paper in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser for value before maturity is immune from the defenses
which might be available against it when suit is brought by the original
holder, unless it be shown that such purchaser had notice of such defenses. [Commercial Credit Co. v. Seale et aL, 30 Ala. App. 440, 8 So.
(2d) 199, 201 (1942).]

The principal case is in accord with the greater weight of authority,
as well as with established mercantile practice. The widespread use
of discounted notes in conditional sales transactions requires judicial
preservation of their negotiability even at the cost of a certain degree
of injustice in individual cases.
William J. Verdonk
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CONsERvATION-EXTENT OF THE POLICE

Powx.--State v. Dexter, ._Wash ..... , 202 P. (2d) 906 (1949). This
was an action by the State of Washington against Avery Dexter for
an injunction to prohibit illegal timber-cutting operations. The state
appealed from a trial court judgment in favor of Dexter. Dexter had
held title in fee simple, since September, 1945, to three hundred and
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twenty acres of marketable second growth timber. From November,
1945, until October, 1947, he had cut considerable quantities of fir,
larch, white pine and hemlock without complying with Wash. Laws
1945, c. 193, as amended by Wash. Laws 1947, c. 218. In 1947, the
state forester became aware of Dexter's illegal operations and directed
him to desist until he obtained a permit. Such a permit would only
be given upon assurance that operations would be conducted in accordance with the state statutes. Dexter refused to comply and proceedings were instituted by the state. The trial court sustained the
demurrer interposed by Dexter on the ground that the statutes referred to above were unconstitutional. The' Supreme Court of Washington reyersed the trial court, and this decision was affirmed without
opinion by the Supreme Court of the United States. Dexter v. State,
... U. S..... , 70 S. Ct. 147 (1949).
In the past, the Federal Government has instituted many programs for the purpose of conserving the soil and natural resources, but
the impossibility of centralizing control over six million farmers, operating under extremely diverse physical conditions, has made supplementary state land-use legislation an administrative as well as a legal
necessity. See Note, 50 YALE L. J. 1056 (1941).
The rule is well settled that not only adjoining landowners, but
the public at large, have an interest in the preservation of the natural
resources of the country, sufficient to justify appropriate legislation designed to prevent exploitation or waste thereof by the owners of the
land on which they are found. Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior
Court, Los Angeles County, California,284 U. S. 8, 52 S. Ct. 103, 76
L. Ed. 136 (1931). It is a well settled principle that the secondary
purpose of forest conservation is the prevention of soil erosion. Huge
quantities of water must be absorbed by the standing timber if millions of tons of soil are to be prevented from washing into the ocean
every year. It can -hardly be doubted that the general welfare is in
serious jeopardy when "recent government studies indicate that more
than half the total land area of the United States has already been
damaged, with 50,000,000 acres rendered unfit for any future cultivation. The direct cost to individual farmers in terms of reduced fertility alone is estimated at more than $400,000,000 a year." See Note,
50 YALE L. J. 1056 (1941).
Dexter, and others who had argued against state conservation legislation, contended that any legislation which limited his alleged right
to the unqualified use and enjoyment of property was a denial of due
process, an infringement of his right to property, and an impairment
of the obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution of the
United States. Recent decisions dealing with related questions would
not seem to bear out Dexter's contentions. It has been held, however, that any law abridging rights to a use of property (which use
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does not infringe the rights of others) or limiting the use of property
beyond what is necessary to provide for the welfare and general security of the public, is not a valid exercise of the police power. The
owner of land has the right to use his property for such legitimate purposes as he may see fit, utilizing such portions of it as he pleases, as
long as in so doing he in no way injuriously affects the public health,
safety, and general welfare of the state. Curran Bill Posting and Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261 (1910).
The Supreme Court of the United States, on the other hand, has
held that, even though a member of a class which is regulated may suffer an economic loss not shared by others, and his property may lose
utility and depreciate in value as a consequence of the regulation, this
does not constitute a barrier to the exercise of the police power. Bowles
v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944);
L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U. S. 587, 20 S. Ct. 788, 44 L. Ed. 899
(1900). A Maine court has asserted that, under the police power of
the state, the legislature may regulate and restrict the use and enjoyment by landowners of the natural resources of the state, so as to protect the state from waste, and prevent the infringement of the rights
of others.. Such legislation, it seems, does not infringe the constitutional inhibitions against the taking of property without due process
of law, or deny the equal protection of the laws, impair the obligation
of contracts, or take property without just compensation. In re
Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 AUt. 627 (1908). In a Washington case decided prior to the principal case, State v. Sears, 4 Wash.
(2d) 200, 103 P. (2d) 337 (1940), it was held that the police power
of the state extends not only to the preservation of the public health,
safety and morals, but also to the preservation and promotion of the
general welfare. In a recent Illinois case, the supreme court declared
that an owner of property has the right to use it as he desires, limited
only by the proper exercise of the police power. Lee v. City of Chicago, 390 Ill. 306, 61 N. E. (2d) 367 (1945). An essential element
of the right of private property is the right to use or dispose of such
property in any lawful manner which does not, however, infringe upon
the rights of others. Property rights are held subject to the reasonable
exercise of the state police powers.
Some states have provided in their constitutions that the natural resources of the state shall be protected, conserved and replenished, and
that the legislature shall enact all laws necessary to protect, conserve
and replenish the natural resources of the state. State v. Thrift Oil &
Gas Co., 162 La. 165, 110 So. 188 (1926).
It was stated in In re Opinion of the Justices, 103 Me. 506, 69 Atl.
627, 628 (1908), that:
It is for the Legislature to determine from time to time the occasion
and what laws and regulations are necessary or expedient for the de-
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fense and benefit of the people; and however inconvenienced, restricted,
or even damaged particular persons and corporations may be, such general laws and regulations are to be held valid, unless there can be
pointed out some provision in the state or United States Constitution
which clearly prohibits them.

It is, as the justices further asserted:
. . . a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civi
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use
of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, nor injurious to the rights of the community.

The trend of recent legislation and decisions mirrors the growth of
the law concerning property rights. The Washington legislature had
recognized the need for state land-use legislation, and the court in the
instant case upheld this legislation on the basis of public policy and
as a valid exercise of the police power.
The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that a regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community satisfies due process. Freedom of contract and property rights are not absolute. They are qualified and
limited by the rights of others. The legislature is the primary judge
of the necessity of an enactment, and the courts are not authorized to
deal with the wisdom of the legislative policy or the adequacy of the
enactment. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct.
578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937).
William G. Greif

CONSTITUIONAL LAW-CONTEMPT By PUBLICATION As A "CLEAR
AND PRESENT DANGER" To THE ADMTNISTRATION OF JUSTICE.-Bal-

timore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, _... Md...... , 67 A. (2d) 497, cert.
denied, .
U. S ..... , 18 L. W. 4090 (1949). In applying the "clear
and present danger" test as set forth by the United States Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that the broadcast
during the pendency of a trial of the fact that an accused has confessed and was convicted of similar crimes does not constitute such
a "clear and present danger" to his right to a fair trial as to justify
an abridgment of -the right of free expression guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
The appellants had been found guilty of contempt by the Criminal
Court of Baltimore City for the broadcast of certain news dispatches
relating to the arrest of one James, who at thai time was in custody
on a charge of murder. James was arrested and held for investigation
in regard to the stabbing of an eleven year old girl. Two days later,
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James made a written confession and was formally charged. On the
basis of information received from the United Press, the appellant
radio stations broadcast news items regarding a prior conviction of
the accused for a similar crime, as well as other facts relating to the
circumstances of his arrest and confession. This information was
obtained from the Police Commissioner of Baltimore, or at least verified by him. James subsequently submitted to a trial by the court
without a jury and was found guilty of first degree murder. James'
counsel elected a trial by the court because, as he testified later at
the contempt proceedings, he "could not have picked a jury that had
not been infected ... by the knowledge of this man's confession and
his criminal background." At the trial, both his confession and the
fact of his previous criminal record were admitted.
The citations for contempt were based upon Rule 904 of the Rules
of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, as well as upon the inherent
power of the courts to issue citations for contempt for the protection
of a prisoner's right to a fair trial. The applicable provisions of Rule
904, as set forth in the instant case, state:
In connection with any case which may be pending in the Criminal
Court of Baltimore, or in connection with any person charged with
crime and in the custody of the Police Department of Baltimore City,
or other constituted authorities, upon a charge of crime over which the
Criminal Court of Baltimore has jurisdiction, whether before or after
indictment, any of the following acts shall be subject to punishment
for contempt: ...

C. The issuance by the police authorities ...
of any statement relative to the conduct of the accused, statements or admissions made by
the accused or other matter bearing upon the issues to be tried ...
E. The publication of any matter which may prevent a fair trial,
improperly influence the court or the jury, or tend in any manner to
interfere with the administration of justice.
F. The publication of any matter obtained as a result of a violation
of this rule.

While the lower court held that paragraph E was invalid and
rested its finding upon paragraph F, the court in the instant case
declared both paragraphs invalid and concluded that the conviction,
to be upheld, would have to be within the inherent power of the
courts to punish for contempt, insofar as that power is not restricted
by the protections afforded by our constitutional system. In holding
further that the exercise of this inherent power in this case violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the court relied on Bridges v.
California, 314 U. S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295
(1946); and Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91
L. Ed. 1546 (1947).
Courts in a majority of the states have ruled that they possess
the power to punish summarily contempt by publication, even though
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there seems to be no valid basis for this assumption at common law.
See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication, 28 CoL. L. RIv.
401-31, 525-62 (1928). Without questioning the basis of the power
as a matter of common law, it is certain that the scope of the power
possessed by American courts is restricted by our constitutional system and is thus much narrower than the power possessed by the
English courts, which have no such restrictions. See the opinion of
Mr. Justice Black in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 264, 62
S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192 (1941). It is now certain that "Freedom
of speech is among the fundamental rights protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75
L. Ed. 1357 (1930). State power to punish for contempt by publication is therefore limited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Pennekamp v. Florida, supra.
The "clear and present danger" test was first introduced by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 39 S. Ct.
247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1918), where he stated:
The question in every case is whether the words are used in such

circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.

Although Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared in Pennekamp v. Florida
that "clear and present danger" was used by Mr. Justice Holmes
only as a literary phrase and not as a technical legal formula, it has,
with some expansion, been consistently used by the court.
In previous attempts to determine the "balance between the desirability of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication,
free from interruption of its processes," Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U. S. 331, 336, 66 S. Ct. 1029, 90 L. Ed. 1295 (1946), the Court
has made it clear that "the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished." Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 263, 62 S. Ct. 193,
86 L. Ed. 192 (1941). As was stated in the most recent case dealing
with a conviction for contempt by publication: "The vehemence of
the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for
contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The danger
must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil."
Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 376, 67 S. Ct. 1249, 91 L. Ed. 1546
(1947).
The dissent in the instant case attacked the holding on the ground
that the cases relied on by the majority have as their ratio decidendi
that all judges have more "fortitude, firmness, wisdom, and honor than
can be expected from everyone in private life," and that therefore an
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act, to constitute a "clear and present danger" which a judge is involved, would have to be of greater magnitude than would an act calculated to affect one not a member of the judiciary. The dissenting judge
was therefore of the opinion that the tests for determining the existence of a "clear and present danger" which have previously been applied
do not apply to cases involving jurors, and thus that the conviction
should have been affirmed. This distinction seems questionable. While
it is true that the cases considered by the Supreme Court were all
cases involving publications which reflected -on the integrity of the
judiciary or which were calculated to influence the conduct of a judge,
it is difficult to say, on the authority of those cases, that the Court
will be any less mindful of the right of free expression when a case
involving a juror is presented to it. But assuming that judges wear
heavier coats of armor against influence from publications, the test is
rendered no less workable; for, the determining of the degree of influence and its effect on justice is no more difficult in the case of a
judge than in the case of a juror.
The mere fact that a juror knows of a confession and a conviction
for a similar crime does not disqualify him, even though such evidence
is inadmissible. All that is required is that the juror has not formed
an opinion which would prevent him from reaching a verdict on the
law and facts as presented at the trial. Ex parte Spies et al., 123 U. S.
131, 31 L. Ed. 80 (1887); Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293, 18 Atl. 39
(1889).
Concededly, any resolution of the conflicting demands of the right
to a fair trial and the right of free expression will not be entirely satisfactory. It is submitted, however, that the result in the instant case
represents at least a workable balance between them that is in accord
with modern constitutional theory.
James L. O'Brien

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FOR RELIGIOUS
SCHOOL STUDENTS.-Visser et ux v. Nooksack Valley School District
No. 506, .Wash ..... , 207 P. (2d) 198 (1949). A Washington statute,
extending transportation at public expense to children attending religious schools, has been held to be a violation of the constitution of
that state. The plaintiffs in this case were seeking a writ of mandamus
to compel the defendant school district to provide transportation for
the plaintiff's children, who attended a religious school in that district.
The supreme court of the state, in affirming a judgment dismissing
the cause, ruled that the statute was repugnant to certain provisions
of the state constitution, WASH. CONST. Art. 1, § 11, and Art. 9, § 4,
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which provide that: "No public money or property shall be appropriated for... the support of any religious establishment"; and that, "All
schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds
shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence." Thus it was
found that the statute in question was, in effect, an appropriation of
public money for the support of a religious cause.
The court, in arriving at this conclusion, premised its argument on
the proposition that religious schools would inevitably derive direct and
substantial benefits from the service authorized by the statute. Because the state is prohibited from appropriating public moneys for a religious cause, it was concluded that the statute was unconstitutional.
In determining the validity of this conclusion, the manner in which
the court regarded the benefits which accrued to the religious school
under the statute in issue should be noted. The court stated that:
Any private, religious, or sectarian schools which are founded upon,
or fostered by, assurances that free public transportation facilities will
be made available to the prospective pupils thereof, occupy the position
of receiving, or expecting to receive, a direct, substantial, and continuing
public subsidy to the schools, as such, thus encouraging their construction
and maintenance, and enhancing their attendance, at public expense.

Proceeding from this point, the court directs itself to a well established principle, ". . . the police power-broad and comprehensive
as it is---may not be exercised in contravention of plain and unambiguous constitutional inhibitions." Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist.
No. 201, 17 Wash. (2d) 61, 135 P. (2d) 79, 80 (1943). From this it
is inferred that the statute in question was invalid because of certain
benefits effected thereby, even though its primary purpose was in
accord with the compulsory educational policy of the state and in
furtherance of public interests. A distinction was made, however, between the benefits conferred by the statute in this case, which are
said to be without the realm of the police power, and other undefined, incidental benefits. The court stated:
Transportation to or from school differs, in both degree and nature,
from those indirect, incipient, and incidental benefits which accrue to
schools, as buildings, or to its pupils, as citizens, under normal health,
welfare, and safety laws of the state.

The court thereby reasons that although the state may indirectly

benefit religion or religious institutions, it had in this instance exceeded its limits.

The justification for this position may be seriously

questioned when the above distinction, as made by the court, is
closely examined. For example, the police officer stationed at a dangerous intersection, so that religious school students may cross safely,
performs a service to the school as well as to the public, for it may
be supposed that many parents would not patronize that school if
there were no police officer at the intersection, and their children were
thus subjected to unnecessary dangers. The function of the police
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officer, with regard to the urban student, is analogous to the function
of the school bus, with regard to the rural student. Both provide for
the safety and welfare of the student, and incidently encourage the
maintenance and enhance the attendance of the school. If the principle announced in this case is valid, it must necessarily extend to
many other similar benefits which accrue to religion and religious institutions; thus it might not be unreasonable to invalidate the tax
exemptions which have so long been enjoyed by religious institutions
in general.
A number of other jurisdictions have, during recent years, been
called upon to judge similar statutes with regard to like constitutional provisions. A California court, in upholding the constitutionality of one of these statutes, Bowker v. Baker et al., 73 Cal. App.
(2d) 653, 167 P. (2d) 256, 258 (1946), gave substance to public interest without ignoring the California constitution. In this case the
court said:
And in considering the constitutionality of the statute, the question
presented is not whether it is possible to condemn it, but whether it is
possible to uphold it. It is not to be declared invalid, because incidental
to the main purpose, there results an advantage to individuals . . .The
legislature is vested with a large discretion in determining what is for the
public good and what are public purposes for which public moneys can
be rightfully expended, and that discretion cannot be controlled by the
courts except when its action is clearly evasive.

This view is shared by other states: Nichols et al v. Henry, 301 Ky.
434, 191 S. W. (2d) 930 (1945); Board of Education v. Wheat, 174
Md. 314, 199 AUt. 628 (1938); Chance et al.v. Mississippi State Textbook Board, 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941). The courts of these
states have recognized the vital and profound interest which the state
has in children-that interest which has been evidenced by the institution of extensive public school systems, compulsory education laws and
other related benefits. Acknowledging the earnest desire of the states
to provide for the welfare of children, the courts have progressed in
the belief that this policy extends to all children and that all should,
therefore, partake of those services which are designed to aid them in
fulfilling their legal duty.
The duty, imposed by compulsory education laws, may be discharged by attendance at a non-public school, for it has been stated
that the American parent has the uncontroverted right fo choose any
school which has been accredited by the state. Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925).
The state may not, as stated by the court in the principal case, "obstruct or discourage the existence of schools established for religious
purposes." While admitting the negative duty of the state toward
the religious school, the court, by its decision, proceeds to place that
school at a distinct disadvantage, so that its very existence may not
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only be discouraged but also seriously threatened. The parent of
the religious school student has the financial burden of supporting two
school systems, i.e., the one provided by the state and the one to which
he has chosen to send his children. It would seem that benefits of the
type conferred in the instant case could well be supplied at the expense
of the state, indiscriminately and without violation of constitutional
provisions, since such benefits must, realistically, be termed incidental
rather than direct and substantial. And the parent, meanwhile, who
chooses to send his children to a religious school, would not be obliged
to bear expenses over and above the direct and substantial support of
such schools. The right which was advocated in Pierce v. Society of
the Sisters,supra, could easily become more of a fiction than a fact. The
court does not consider this possibility when it dispassionately states:
"... it must ever be remembered that

. . .

all children . . . have a

perfect right to attend the public schools and thus avail themselves
of the opportunity and benefit of transportation to such schools."
Justice Black, in rendering the majority opinion in Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 18, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947),
found that a New Jersey statute, akin to the one in the present case,
did not violate the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Subtle
and vague distinctions were not used as a means of invalidating the
statute which was laudable in its purpose; the expenditure of public
funds for transportation of children attending non-public schools was
viewed in the proper perspective, as was the true relation of Church
and State:
Of course, cutting off church schools from these services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function, would
make it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment
requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions
than it is to favor them.

The Supreme Court, in the Everson case, did not attempt to reset the
wall of separation which stands between the Church and the State so
as to penalize adherents of certain religious beliefs, nor did it seek to
establish a rule which would favor individuals or groups of individuals,
for the Court was in accord with the earlier view of the Court in
Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370, 375,
50 S. Ct. 335, 74 L. Ed. 913 (1930), that "Individual interests are
aided only as the common interest is safeguarded." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Washington court, in the instant case, has agreed that "transportation is in furtherance of compulsory education policy" and "represents.., the legislative concern for the safety of children who must
use the highways in attending school in accordance with the law," but
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has unfortunately concluded that this "is beside the question." If
this reasoning were to be given universal application, it would certainly cause the policy of the state, in providing for the public welfare, to suffer some embarrassment in the extension of aid to non-profit
hospitals which are open to the general public but operated by religious groups, Kentucky Bldg. Comm. et aL. v. Effron, 310 Ky. 355,
220 S. W. (2d) 836,25 NOTRE DAE LAwvER 155 (1949); and in furnishing secular books to religious school students, Chance et al. v. Mississippi State Textbook Board, supra; and in giving aid to war veterans
returning to schools, public, private and religious, State ex rel. Atwood
v. Johnson, 170Wis. 251, 176 N. W. 224 (1920).
The doctrinaire application in the instant case of the principle of
separation of Church and State can hardly be commended. It would
seem that the rationale of the court proceeds with a view to freedom
from religion rather than freedom of religion.
F. Richard Kramer

CONTRACTS-FEDERAL

EMPLOYERS'

LIABILITY AcT-VALIDIny

or

RiGHTS.-Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western
R. Co,..
U. S..... , 70 S. Ct. 26 (1949). The defendant, Boyd, was
injured in Battle Creek, Michigan, while employed by the plaintiff,
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company. At the request of the defendant, the plaintiff railroad company had, on two occasions, advanced
him fifty dollars. In consideration of the said advancements, the defendant signed agreements which stipulated that if his claim could
not be settled and he wished to commence an action for damages
against the railroad, such suit should "be commenced within the county or district where I resided at the time my injuries were sustained, or
in the county or district where my injuries were sustained and not
elsewhere." Although the defendant signed this agreement limiting
the trial forums to either the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Michigan, or the United States District Court of the Eastern District of
Michigan, he nevertheless commenced an action in the Superior Court
of Cook County, Illinois. The plaintiff railroad, relying upon the
aforementioned agreements, instituted this action in a circuit court of
Michigan to enjoin the defendant from prosecuting that suit. The
Michigan Circuit Court held that the agreements were void and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court of Michigan on appeal of this
case held that the contracts were valid on the grounds that venue relates to the convenience of the parties, and as such, the right may be
waived by either party. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. Boyd, 321
Mich. 693, 33 N. W. (2d) 120 (1948). On appeal to the Supreme
CoNTAcRs

WAInG VENUE
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Court of the United States, the latter ruling was reversed and the
Court held that the employee's right to the choice of venue could not
be waived. The Court stated that any agreement between the employer and employee in which a waiver was attempted was void, since
it constituted a method by which the carrier could limit its liability
and was a direct contradiction of the congressional intent as set out
in the broad provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35
STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. (1946).
Contracts which unreasonably restrict the choice of venue have often
been vitiated because they are considered contrary to public policy.
See RESTATEENT, CONTRACTS § 558 (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1725 (Rev. ed. 1938). Yet there has been a great conflict
in the results reached by various lower tribunals when such contracts
come within the scope of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In
view of this diversity in the interpretation of the Act, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari, Boyd v. Grand Trunk
Western R. Co., 337 U. S. 923, 69 S. Ct. 1172, 93 L. Ed. 1039 (1949),
in order that the Court might rule on this matter for the first time.
The precise question presented in this case was whether the agreement by the defendant waiving the privilege of venue afforded him by
section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, was such a "contract, rule, regulation or device" as would enable-the carrier to exempt
itself from liability in frustration of the intent of Congress as expressed
in section 5 of the Act.
The provisions of section 5 state that "any contract, rule, regulation
or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable
any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this
Act, shall to that extent be void... ." 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C.
§ 55 (1946). Section 6, relating to the privilege of venue in a suit by
an employee, states that "an action may be brought in a district court
of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant,
or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall
be doing business at the time of commencing such action." 35 STAT.
66 (1908), as amended, 62 STAT. 989 (1948), 45 U. S. C. § 56 (Supp.
1948).
The obvious intent of Congress in the enactment of certain amending provisions in 1911 was to enable an injured employee to bring a suit
at any place specified in section 6 which would be most convenient to
him. The legislative history of the Act shows that the venue provisions
were chosen to remedy the gross injustices resulting from the superior
economic bargaining position of the carriers and the restrictive venue
provisions of the original Liability Act, 34 STAT. 232 (1906), which in
many cases compelled the employee to travel great distances and expend unreasonable sums to litigate his claim. The occurrence of this
practice was frequent at the time of the passage of this section.- In the
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words of Senator Borah, who submitted the report of the bill, section 6
was to enable the employees "to find the corporation at any point or
place or State where it is actually carrying on business, and there
lodge his action, if he chooses to do so." 45 CONG. REc. 4034 (1910).
The interpretation of section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act is set forth in Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U. S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 422,
86 L. Ed. 575 (1941), which differs from the principal case in that a
condition precedent of returning the advancement was placed on the
employee before he could commence an action against the carrier. In
that case, the Supreme Court of the United States viewed the legislative
history of section 5 and said that "Congress wanted section 5 to have
the full effect that its comprehensive phraseology implies." Duncan v.
Thompson, 315 U. S. 1, 6, 62 S. Ct. 422, 86 L. Ed. 575 (1941). The
purpose of Congress was to broaden the scope of section 5 and make
it more comprehensive by a generic description, thereby bringing within
its purview any contract, rule, regulation or device to exempt a carrier from liability. PhiladelphiaB. & W. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S.
603, 32 S. Ct. 589, 56 L. Ed. 911 (1912). From these two decisions,
it is evident that the intent of Congress in enacting section 5 of the
Liability Act was to stamp out the many and various attempts of
employers to limit their liability in suits by their employees. See also
H. R. REP. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1908).
What interpretation have the courts given provisions respecting
venue in suits arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act?
Generally, venue provisions of the Judiciary Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1391
et seq. (Supp. 1948), may be waived as they are mere expressions of a
personal privilege respecting the venue, Neirbo Co. et al. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U. S. 165, 60 S. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167
(1939). But such has not been the case when the venue provisions
of the Liability Act have been construed. Courts have not looked with
favor on attempts to waive these provisions, as these provisions have
been considered a matter of right. These are statutory rights conferred on a private person, but which affect the public interest, and
generally such rights cannot be waived. Akerly v. New York Central
R. Co., 168 F. (2d) 812 (6th Cir. 1948); cf. Brooklyn Savings Bank
v. O'Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 65 S. Ct. 895, 89 L. Ed. 1296 (1945).
In the principal case, the Court adopted the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in approving its holding in Ex parte Collette, 337 U. S. 55,
69 S. Ct. 944 (1949), that nothing in the revised Judiciary Code,
28 U. S. C. §§ 1391-1406 (Supp. 1948), affects the initial choice
of venue afforded employees under section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The revised code allows for the transference of any civil action to any other district for the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice, 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a)
(Supp. 1948). This, however, does not limit or otherwise modify any
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right in section 6 of the Liability Act, and an action may still be
brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been
brought previously. Ex parte Collette, supra; cf. Kilpatrick v. Texas
and P. Ry. Co., 337 U. S. 75, 69 S. Ct. 953 (1949). Prior to the
revision of the Judiciary Code, the application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens was not available in Liability Act suits.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct.
6, 86 L. Ed. 28 (1941); Miles et al. v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,
315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. Ed. 1129 (1942); seeMcKnett v.
St. Louis and San FranciscoRailway Co., 292 U. S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 690,
78 L. Ed. 1227 (1934).
With regard to the venue provisions of the Liability Act as a burden
on interstate commerce, in Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Co. et al. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284, 52 S. Ct. 152, 76 L. Ed. 295 (1932),
it was said that the disadvantage of litigation far from the scene of
the accident was not substantial enough to justify a state court in forbidding the continuation of litigation in a district where the lines of the
carrier were located. A carrier must submit to the requirements of
orderly, effective administration of justice, although thereby interstate
commerce is incidentally burdened. Hoffman v. Missouri ex rel. Foraker, 274 U. S. 21, 47 S. Ct. 485, 71 L. Ed. 247 (1927). Congress
has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and thereby it may
place incidental burdens on it. Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v.
Vigor, 90 F. (2d) 7 (6th Cir. 1937). The privilege of venue is an
absolute one and an alleged burden on interstate commerce is not sufficient to extinguish this right. Sacco v. Baltimore and 0.R' Co., 56
F. Supp. 959 (E. D. N. Y. 1944).
Distinguished from the principal case is Callen v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. Ed. 24 (1948). In
that case, an injured employee executed a general release of "all claims
and demands which I have, or can, or may have" against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for the personal injuries sustained. The Supreme Court of the United States held that this "release" of claims
against the railroad was not a violation of the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, since a release of claims does not exempt
it from liability, but is a means of compromising a claimed liability.
The cases in the lower courts which hold contra to the Court's
opinion in the instant case make a sharp distinction between liability
and venue or substantive rights and procedural rights. They also hold
that the contracts which limit venue are not opposed to public policy,
because there exists a right to waive such venue provisions. By maintaining this proposition, these courts would seem to have disregarded
congressional intent and the reasoning of Duncan v. Thompson, supra.
See Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp. 903 (W. D. Mo. 1945);
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Clark v. Lowden et al., 48 F. Supp. 261 (Minn. 1942); Ditwiler v,
Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269 N. W. 367 (1936).
From the standpoint of the principal case, it appears that the intent
of Congress was to afford an injured employee an unrestricted choice of
the forums authorized in section 6 of the Liability Act and to confer
a substantial right which was not to be subject to waiver in any manner whatsoever. The Supreme Court, in the instant case, by holding
that the contract was invalid on the grounds that it was a limitation
of liability on the part of the carrier, has given effect to the clear
intent of Congress.
The abuse to which the broad provisions of section 6 have been put
in the past seems, however, a matter of proper concern for Congress.
The increasing use of these provisions in furthering schemes to coerce
settlements by threats of litigation far from the place of the injury is
well known. See Atcheson, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Andrews et al .... Ill.
App ..... 88 N. E. (2d) 364 (1949). Legislative re-examination of the
venue provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act could do
much to achieve a proper balance in effectuating the purpose for which
it was originally enacted.
Louis Albert Halner

CRIMINAL

LAw-CONSTITUTIONAL

STATxJTES.-Smith v. State,

LAw-HABITUAL

CRIMINAL

_Ind ..... 87 N. E. (2d) 881 (1949). The

state, in a two-count indictment, charged the defendant with vehicle
taking under IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3011 (Burns 1933), and further
alleged that the defendant was an habitual criminal under the Indiana
Habitual Criminal Act. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2207 (Burns 1933). The
Indiana Habitual Criminal Act provides that any defendant who has
previously been convicted of two felonies, shall upon conviction of a
third felony, be imprisoned for life. Defendant was tried by a jury,
found guilty of both counts, and was given a life sentence. In his
appeal the defendant attacked the Habitual Criminal Act on three
grounds: first, that it was unconstitutional; second, that the conduct
of the trial had resulted in prejudicial error; and third, that vehicle
taking did not come within the scope of the habitual criminal statute.
In questioning the constitutionality of the statute, it was contended
that the accused was subjected to double jeopardy, that the punishment inflicted was cruel and unusual, and that the law was ex post
facto in its effect. The court upheld the validity of the statute, and
in doing so, maintained that the accused was not put in jeopardy twice
for the same crime, since the Habitual Criminal Act does not charge
a crime per se, but merely increases the punishment for the third
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offense. The opinion of the court did not consider the question of
cruel and unusual punishment, but in other jurisdictions the argument
has been refuted on the grounds that the words, "cruel and unusual"
apply to medieval methods of punishment and not merely to an. increase in the duration of time to be spent in confinement. McDonald
v. Commonwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 874 (1899); State v.
Moore, 121 Mo. 514, 26 S. W. 345 (1894); State ex rel. Larabee v.
Barnes, 3 N. D. 319, 55 N. W. 883 (1893); see Davis v. Berry, 216
Fed. 413 (S. D. Iowa 1914), where sterilization of criminals was held
to be a cruel and unusual punishment.
The defendant contended that the statute was ex post facto on
the theory that the prior offense occurred before the act became effective, but the court rejected this argument on the ground that the punishment imposed was not for, nor did it relate back to the first offense,
but that the punishment was for the third offense only, and was made
greater because of the situation in which the defendant by his previous
crimes had placed himself.
A search of the authorities reveals that the constitutionality of such
statutes increasing the punishment for a second or subsequent offense
has been repeatedly attacked, but the courts have consistently upheld
them. Iowa ex Tel. Gregory v. Jones, 128 Fed. 626 (S. D. Iowa 1904);
People v. Smith, 36 Cal. App. 88, 171 Pac. 696 (1918); State v. Dowden, 137 Iowa 573, 115 N. W. 211 (1908); Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 177 Ky. 690, -198 S. W. 24 (1917); Conmonwealth -v.
Graves,
155 Mass. 163, 29 N. E. 579 (1891); In re Miller, 110 Mich. 676, 68
N. W. 990 (1896); Taylor v. State, 114 Neb. 257, 207 N. W. 207
(1926); People v. Dean, 94 Misc. 502, 159 N. Y. S. 601 (1916);
Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 36 N. E. 18 (1893); Tucker
v. State, 14 Okla. Crim. Rep. 54, 167 Pac. 637 (1917); State v.
Le Pitre, 54 Wash. 166, 103 Pac. 27 (1909). The courts in upholding habitual criminal statutes, base their reasoning on the premise that the offense is against the state, and that it does no violence
to aiy constitutioial guaranty for the state to rid itself of depravity
when its reform efforts have failed. The true ground upon which
these statutes are sustained would seem to be that the punishment is
imposed for the subsequent offense only, and that in determining the
amount or nature of the penalty to be inflicted, the legislature may require the courts to take into consideration the persistence of the defendant in his criminal course. When a person has proved immune
to correction by the ordinary modes of punishment inflicted upon first
offenders, it then becomes the duty of the government not only to seek
some other method to curb his criminal propensities, that he might
not continue further to inflict himself upon law abiding members of
society, but as well, by example, to deter others similarly inclined from
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repeated, felonious acts. .See People v. Rose, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 513,
79 P. (2d) 737 (1938).
The defendant in his second line of attack claimed prejudicial error
resulted from informing the jury of the prior convictions, upon the
theory that in reading the allegations in the indictment, the minds of
the jurors were prejudiced at the outset of the trial. The court, in
overcoming this argument, held that the allegation of the previous
crimes was for the single purpose of classifying the defendant as an habitual criminal, and for no other purpose. Moreover, the Indiana tribunal concluded that, although the jury had been informed of the prior
convictions, they had no right to consider such proof as bearing upon
the charge for which the defendant was on trial. Thus, the court reasoned, the defendant had not suffered prejudicial error. Considering
the impracticality of eliminating such an impression from the human
mind, and the storms of protest over these matters in sister jurisdictions,
it would seem that such a rationalization is conjectural. The problem
has been clearly set forth by Pennsylvania's former Chief Justice
Paxon, who criticized the practice thusly:
To allege in a bill of indictment charging a man with a high felony
that he had previously been convicted of a similar offense, would be

an anomaly in the administration of the criminal law. It would go
very far to secure his conviction. It would settle every question of
doubt decisively against him. It would render his evidence of good
character of no practical value. That which in other cases is jealously
excluded by all the rules of evidence, would be here thrown in with

most disastrous consequences to the defendant, at a time too, when, of
all others, he should have a fair trial...
.[Commonwealth v. Morrow, 9
Phila. 583 (1872), as quoted in 14 TEms. L. Q. 386, 392 (1940).l

Under enlightened modern legislation for habitual criminals, the
spirit of the rule which recognizes a defendant's right to a fair trial
has been protected by statute in several states and in England. Their
procedure divides the indictment into two parts. The entire indictment is read to the accused, and his plea taken in the absence of
jurors. When the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the clerk reads
only that part of the indictment which sets forth the crime for which
the defendant is to be tried. The trial then proceeds in every respect
as if there were no allegations of former convictions; no mention of
such convictions is made in the evidence, in the remarks of counsel,
or in the charge of the court. When the jurors retire to consider their
verdict, only the first part of the indictment, on which the crime
charged is set out, is given to them. If the jurors return a verdict of
guilty, the second part of the indictment, in which former convictions
are alleged, is read to them without re-swearing them, and they are
then charged to inquire on that issue. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1093 (1949);
NEB. Rav. STAT. § 29-2221 (1943); Oino CODE ANN. § 13744-3
(1938); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 19, § 924 (1930); The Prevention of
Crime Act, 1908, 8 EDW. VII, c. 59, § 10.
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The latter procedure seems highly desirable, since it prevents the
jury from, on the one hand, convicting because of past crimes, and on
the other, acquitting because of the severity of the punishment. Such
a procedure, weighing the utility of justice on the one extreme and
the pound of flesh on the other, seems both just and expedient.
The third question presented in the instant case arose on the extension given to the term "felony." The court held that the habitual
criminal statute covers all felonies, including vehicle taking.
The Indiana Criminal Code defines a felony as any crime punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison. IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 9-101 (Burns 1933). Petit larceny, the unlawful taking of goods
valued at twenty-five dollars or less, is punishable by confinement in
the state prison, and is a felony.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3002 (Bums

1933). Nonsupport is a felony. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-1402 (Bums
1933).
In the light of the wide potential given to the definition of a felony,
it would appear that a person might be sent to prison for life for
committing a series of offenses which do not render him a serious
social menace. Conversely, it is conceivable that where the prior
offense was on a federal charge, no matter how grave, the offender
would not be punishable under the Indiana Habitual Criminal Act
since the confinement would be in a "federal penitentiary" and hence
not within the purview of the statutory definition which limits "felony"
to incarceration in a "state prison." Both Texas and Georgia have
encountered such difficulties where those charged with being habitual
criminals had been previously imprisoned in federal penitentiaries.
Garcia v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. Rep. 340, 145 S. W. (2d) 180 (1940);
Lowe v. State, 50 Ga. App. 369, 178 S. E. 203 (1935). California has
provided against such an occurrence by including the words "State
prison and/or Federal penal institution," in its statute. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 644 (1949).
Bearing in mind that many minor offenses have come within the
.scope of the term "felony," several states have, in their habitual criminal statutes, enumerated the crimes which are punishable by an increased penalty. CAL. PEN. CODE § 644 (1949); ILL. ANN. STAT.
§ 37.563 (1936); Oo CODE ANN. § 13744-1 (1938); PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 18, § 5108 (1945). The enumerated crimes are limited to
the more serious felonies involving moral turpitude, serious bodily
harm, armed violence, grand theft and the like.
It is submitted that the existing Indiana statute may lead to an extremely harsh and disproportionate result in many instances. It would
seem that unless some qualification is given to the term "felony," by
the legislature, a growing opposition to this and similar laws may be
expected.
Peter F. Flakerty
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EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-PRIvILEGE

AGAINST

DISGRAE.-In

re

Vince, .-.N. J... , 67 A. (2d) 141 (1949). This case came before the
Supreme Court of New Jersey on an appeal from a dismissal of an
order to show cause why respondent should not answer a question propounded to her while testifying before the grand jury. Respondent
had admitted to the county prosecutor, in his office, that a criminal
abortion had been performed on her, but upon her appearance before
the grand jury, she had refused to testify because the answers might
tend to incriminate or disgrace her. The court decided that an expectant mother could not be guilty of the statutory crime of abortion, because the statute, in terms, applies only to those performing the act upon the woman. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2:105-1 (1937). The common law
offense of abortion had, as its essential element, the requirement that
the child had quickened. As the abortion in this case had been performed within the first eight weeks of pregnancy, the respondent obviously was not guilty of either the common law or, because of its
language, the statutory crime. Consequently, because the respondent's
testimony in the investigation would not expose her to criminal prosecution, she had no privilege to refuse to answer on the theory of selfincrimination.
The court further stated that there was not, nor had there ever
been, a privilege against self-disgrace in New Jersey; therefore, her
refusal was unjustified. The decision of the lower court was reversed
and the cause was remanded. The court buttressed its opinion by
pointing out that in a treatise on evidence published only seven years
before the American Revolution, GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (3d
ed. 1769), there had been no mention of any such privilege; that
neither the Constitution of the United States nor that of New Jersey
contains any provision that a witness need not testify if the answer
would tend to disgrace or degrade; the court further observed that
statutes protecting witnesses against self-incriminating answers limit
the immunity to answers which would expose such persons to criminal
prosecution or penalty, or to forfeiture of estate. This statutory limitation was construed by the court to mean that the privilege contended
for in the instant case is not recognized by the legislature.
American courts, for the most part, deny a witness the privilege of
refusing to testify when the answer would result in disgrace. The Supreme Court of the United States stated in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.
591, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896), that a witness cannot claim
a privilege against an answer that would tend to disgrace him or bring
public disfavor upon him, unless the question relates not to the main
issue, but to the credibility of the witness.
New York courts have consistently held, since People v. Mather, 4
Wend. 229, 250 (N. Y. 1830), that it is not enough for a witness to
show that the answer to the question propounded would tend to dis-
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grace him or expose him to public infamy; he must show that it would
subject him to prosecution before he can be excused from answering.
The court said:
If a witness is allowed to decline answering when examined for one
purpose, because the answer may show him infamous, perhaps it may be
a refinement to hold that he is debarred the same privilege when exposed to the same result because the question is material to the merits
of the cause. If the objection to answer be placed . . . on the ground
that the witness may be disgraced thereby, his privilege attaches when
that result would be produced by the answer . . . it is not enough for
the witness to allege that the answer will have a tendency to expose
him to infamy or disgrace. The question must be such that the answer
to it . . . will directly show the infamy, and the court must see that
such will be the case before they will allow the excuse to prevail.

This position, however, has been modified by People ex rel. Hackley
v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. (10 Smith) 75 (1861), and People v. Sharp,
107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1887), so that now neither disgrace,
opprobrium, nor infamy is sufficient to enable the witness to escape
answering, especially where the answer is material to the issue.
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Kendrick v. The Commonwealth, 78 Va. 490, 496 (1884), supports the same doctrine as
enunciated in the later New York opinions. The Virginia court refused to recognize the "Spartan morality which deprecates not the
perpetration but only the exposure of crime." Unless the witness
claims the privilege because his answer would incriminate and expose
him to criminal prosecution, he must answer. The Supreme Court
of California followed the same reasoning in holding that the only
ground for refusal to testify is self-incrimination, and that the tendency of a question. to disgrace the witness to whom it is propounded is insufficient to create a privilege. Ex Parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184
(1857).
The New Jersey court, in its opinion in the instant case, cites
a number of cases which recognized the doctrine of privilege against
disgrace. The leading case is Rex v. Lewis, 4 Esp. 225, 170 Eng. Rep.
700 (1802), where Lord Ellenborough refused to allow the counsel for
the defense to ask the prosecuting witness whether or not. he had
been in a house of correction, on the grounds that the object of the
question was to degrade. Lord Ellenborough made the ruling on his
own motion, holding it as settled law. Another case pointed out by
the New Jersey court was that of MacBride v. MacBride, 4 Esp. 242,
170 Eng. Rep. 706 (1802), in which Lord Alvaney refused to allow
a question to be put to a witness because its purpose was to disgrace.
In both the Lewis and the MacBride cases, however, the question did
not relate to the issues, but only to the credibility of the-witnesses.
At least one English case has not followed the reasoning of
the Lewis and MacBride cases. See Cundell v. Pratt, M. & M. 108,
173 Eng. Rep. 1098 (1827), where an objection to a question was
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urged on the ground that it would disgrace the witness. The judge
refused to allow the question, but only because the answer would
subject the witness to prosecution. The judge stated that he did not
recognize the privilege against disgrace as having any standing in
English law.
Where the privilege has been recognized, because the answer would
disgrace, degrade, or make infamous, the vast majority of cases have
allowed it only where the question was directed to the character of
the witness for impeachment purposes, or to attack credibility. See
Rex v. Lewis, supra; MacBride v. MacBride, supra. It seems seldom
to have been permitted where the matter concerned the issues or
went to the merits of the cause. The privilege could only be claimed
if the answer would subject the witness to criminal prosecution.
Neither the English courts, which allowed the privilege, nor the
Supreme Court of the United States, in giving passing recognition to
the privilege against disgrace in attacks on credibility, has intimated
otherwise.
Possibly the best discussion of the privilege against disgrace is
by Mr. Justice Field in his dissent to Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
632, 16 S. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896). He states that the intent
of the framers of the Constitution was not alone to protect a witness
from self-incrimination, but to ". . . at the same time, save him in
all cases from the shame and infamy of confessing disgraceful crimes,
and thus preserve to him such measure of self respect." Justice Field
admitted that there was no common law privilege against self-disgrace,
but insisted that it was a constitutional prerogative which altered
the common law and gave additional protection to a witness. Justice
Field seems to have extended the doctrine to cover, questions relating
to the issues and merits of the case as well as to those asked for purposes of impeachment. Another American case which approves this
view is United States v. James, 60 Fed. 257, 265 (N. D. Ill. 1894).
In that case, District Judge Grossup pointed out that a man cannot
be compelled to give testimony that would subject him to criminal
prosecution or to ostracism by his neighbors. The opinion reads in
part:
Exposure, self confessed exposure, would lose him his place in society,
his good name in the world, and, like a bill of attainder, taint his blood
and that of all who inherit it. It is not difficult to suppose a -case where
the inquiry of the government was not directed to his crime, but to
something immeasurably less important and inconsequential. The benefit
to society might be a trifle, compared with the catastrophe to him and
his descendents. I am not impressed with the belief that he has no
right to stand upon the constitutional privilege of silence....

The witness had refused to testify, although granted statutory immunity for any crime that might be disclosed thereby, because of the disgrace and public opprobrium attaching to his testimony.
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In his treatise on evidence, WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2255 (2d ed.
1923), Wigmore attacks the theory of the privilege against disgrace
and the supporting reasoning of Justice Field and District Judge Grossup. Wigmore points out that there is a vast difference between allowing a refusal to answer because the reply might result in criminal prosecution, and allowing it because of possible disgrace. He states that
the constitutional privilege against self-disgrace, "discovered" by Justice
Field, is a mere assumption on the part of the Justice and nothing
more. The majority opinion in Brown v. Walker, supra, is given
favorable mention.
The principal case fortifies Wigmore's contention that there is a
vast difference between privilege against disgrace, and privilege against
self-incrimination. In the instant case, the witness could not be subjected to criminal prosecution; only the possibility of disgrace remained. Her testimony was material to the case. Even if the privilege, allowed elsewhere, of refusing to testify where the question relates
to no material issue had been available in New Jersey, she could not
have taken advantage of it, because the questions related to the very
heart of the issue in the case. The New Jersey court here reaffirmed
the principle that a person can keep silent only when, by speaking,
criminal action against the witness can result. Where the effect of the
question would be only to unveil the witness' past indiscretions, the
court will not permit the witness' pride or reputation to block the
administration of justice.
In a similar case in New York, where the privilege against disgrace
was given. some recognition, the person upon whom an abortion had
been performed was asked a series of questions, none of which were
material to the case or to her credibility as a witness. The trial court
refused to order the witness to answer because the sole purpose of
the questions was to disgrace and embarrass. The right of the
witness to refuse to answer was affirmed, the appellate court stating that a question requiring a disgracing answer, in order to be
allowed, must be material to the case, and where it is not, the witness
need not reply. Lohman v. People, 1 N. Y. (1 Comst.) 379 (1848);
see also, People ex rel. Hackley v. Kelly, supra; People v. Sharp,
supra.
The conclusion then seems to be that the privilege against selfdisgrace, even where recognized by the courts, generally only protects
a witness from revealing facts which would not materially affect the
case. In some of these cases, the courts have allowed the privilege
where the questions were for impeachment purposes; others have
allowed it if the answer would have embarrassed and shamed the witness; still others have refused to allow it at all. The broadest privilege, that of refusing to answer a question even though it is relative
to the issues of the case, was allowed, as previously noted, m one
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federal case, United States v. James, supra, and vigorously advocated
by Mr. Justice Field in his dissent in Brown v. Walker, supra. This
theory has found little, if any, acceptance elsewhere. The majority
and best view, as evidenced by cases collected in 3 WHARTON, CRmUNAL EVIDENCE § 1119 (11th ed. 1935), supports the privilege against
disgrace only where material issues or the veracity of witnesses are
not in question.
Wilmer L. McLaughlin

EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-PRIVILEGED

COMMUNICATIONS

BETWEEN

HUSBAND AND WImE-United States v. Walker, 176 F. (2d) 564 (2d
Cir. 1949). The defendant, Walker, appealed from a verdict in
which he was found guilty of carrying, in interstate commerce, money
which he had feloniously taken by fraud with intent to steal. Walker
had obtained by fraud from Mary Ashe the sum of $49,500. The
first count alleged that he had transported $26,000 on February 17,
1947; the second count alleged that $23,500 was transported on June
1, 1947. Mary Ashe was the last of three victims to be defrauded
by the defendant. Walker's first victim was Clara Duerr Walker, who
was followed by Sally Grehan. The former was defrauded of over
$15,000, while the latter suffered a loss of over $20,000. Walker
married all three. The first marriage to Clara Duerr Walker, however,
was the only valid one.
Defendant's main contention on appeal was that the testimony
of his wife Clara Duerr Walker had been improperly admitted in the
lower court. His wife had testified to certain conversations with her
husband during their courtship and after their marriage. The only
communication considered confidential in her testimony was a letter
which the defendant had written to her. The letter proved to be
extremely damaging to the defendant's case. The Court of Appeals
in the instant case held that no part of the testimony of Clara Walker
was admissible and therefore reversed the judgment and remanded
the cause.
The court a-mitted that a wife may testify against her husband
when the crime charged was an offense against her person. This, is
an exception to the common law rule which prohibits testimony by
either spouse in behalf of or against the other. However, the instant
case, as the court pointed out, does not fall within this exception,
for the reason that the wife was not the victim of the frauds for
which the husband was being tried. Necessity is usually the basis for
the exception; for without the wife's testimony in such a case, the
prosecution must often fail. Calloway v. State, 92 Tex. 506, 244 S. W.
549 (1922); 8 WIGoRolE, EVIDENCE § 2338 (3d ed. 1940). There
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is no such necessity when the wife testifies to an offense against
another person and her testimony is merely corroboratory or confirmatory.
Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed.
429 (1892), and Hendrix v. United States, 219 U. S. 79, 31 S. Ct.
193, 59 L. Ed. 102 (1910), were early cases which stated that the
common law rule is to govern the competency of witnesses in criminal
trials in the courts of the United States. In 1887, another exception
to the common law rule was sanctioned by statute, 24 STAT. 635
(1887), but the law was subsequently repealed. This statute permitted a wife, with her consent, to testify against her husband (except
as to confidential communications), in a prosecution for bigamy or
unlawful cohabitation under any statute of the United States.
A number of decisions have strictly interpreted the common law
rule and have held incompetent a wife's testimony on behalf of her
husband. Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U. S. 189, 41 S. Ct. 98,
65 L. Ed. 214 (1920); Hendrix v. United States, supra; Liberato v.
United States, 13 F. (2d) 564 (9th Cir. 1926); Fasculo v. United
States, 7 F. (2d) 961 (9th Cir. 1925); Slick v. United States, 1 F.
(2d) 897 (7th Cir. 1924); Kraskowitz v. United States, 282 Fed.
599 (4th Cir. 1922).
However, in Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212,
78 L. Ed. 369 (1933), the Court stated that the fundamental basis
for all rules of evidence should be founded upon their adaptation to
the successful development of the truth. The Court allowed the wife of a
man on trial for a criminal offense in a federal court to testify in her
husband's behalf, despite the common law rule under which such testimony is incompetent. The Court justified this action by stating that the
Supreme Court of the United States and other federal courts may
decline to enforce the ancient common law rule where conditions
have changed and eiperience has shown the fallacy or unwisdom of
the old rule. The procedural rule adopting the common law principles as to the admissibility of evidence, FED. R. Cm. P. 26, was
a direct outgrowth of the Funk case. This rule states:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules.
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules
otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience.

In Yoder v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 665 (10th Cir. 1935), there
is a dictum to the effect that, like a wife's incompetence to testify
in her husband's behalf, a wife's incompetence to testify against him
should be abolished. However, in Paul v. United States, 79 F. (2d)
561 (3d Cir. 1936), the court stated that it was error to allow a
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husband to testify against his wife, and that the common law rule
is not so relaxed as to permit testimony against the wife. The same
-rule was followed in Brunner v. United States, 168 F. (2d) 281
(6th Cir. 1948), where a wife's testimony against her husband was
held to be incompetent.
It is obvious that the question now confronting the federal courts
in criminal proceedings is how strictly the common law rule regarding
testimony by either spouse for or against the other is to be followed.
In answer to this query the court in the principal case stated:
It is always a debatable question how far any relevant evidence
should be privileged. It deprives the party against whom the privilege
is invoked of access to the truth; and a disclosure of the whole truth
should be the prime concern of a court of justice. Whether in a given
situation the interest of the privileged party in suppressing the truth,
ought to outweigh that concern would seem to be a matter for Congress,
and not for the courts. Moreover, unlike the spouse's disqualification
as such this conflict of interest is by no means one-sided, because, although
it is not very usual for it to arise unless the spouses are estranged,
not all estrangements are final, and nothing could more dispose the
privileged spouse to treasure enmity and to repulse any overtures of
reconciliation than the memory of what will ordinarily rankle as
treachery. Nor is it either practicable or desirable to make the decision
dependent upon the judge's conclusion that in the instance before him
the marriage has already been so far wrecked that there is nothing to

save.
Certainly a most important consideration in this matter should
be the promotion of marital peace. It is surprising that there has not
been a more pronounced trend away from the common law rule
regarding privileged communications between husband and wife considering the present-day secularist attitude toward marriage. If communications between attorney and client, physician and patient, priest
and penitent, are still inviolable, as they should be, then communications between husband and wife should likewise continue to be protected, even though in some instances justice may not be expediently
administered.
Louis F. DiGiovanni

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDUREIGNORANCE OF CONTENTS OF WRITTEN ADMISSION As "GOOD CAUSE"
UNDER RULE 34.-Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F. (2d)

476 (D. C. Cir. 1949). The fact that the plaintiff has forgotten the
contents of a statement signed by him and delivered to the defendant

before the plaintiff was represented by an attorney is not "good
cause," justifying an order to produce under procedural Rule 34,
FED. R. Civ. P. 34, which provides in part:
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Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon
notice to all other parties. . the court ... may (1) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying . . . of any designated
documents . . . which constitute or contain evidence relating to any
of the -matters . . . permitted by Rule 26 (b) and which tre in his
possession, custody, or control ...

The plaintiff sued for injuries sustained when he slipped on the
floor of the Safeway Stores, Incorporated. Two weeks after the
accident, an investigator for the defendant's insurer procured from the
plaintiff a signed statement of the circumstances. To the chagrin of
the plaintiff's attorneys, their client could recall neither the content
nor the import of the statement. Anticipating possible embarrassment,
the plaintiff moved, through his attorneys, that the court order the
document produced for inspection, stating the grounds as follows:
Plaintiff says that said statement was signed by him before he was
represented by counsel . . . that it was not obtained by any attorney
for the defendant; and that said statement contains evidence material
and relevant to the pending action.

The court also considered the following contention urged by the plaintiff in the course of argument in the court below, although not made
a part of the formal allegations:
We need to know what our man said ...
This statement is needed
to -help us prepare for trial, to give us some advance warning of any
material change in his statement made to the defendant's investigator,
different than what he gave us as to the claim.

The order of the district court granting the motion was reversed, on
the authority of Martin v. Capital Transit Co., 170 F. (2d) 811
(D. C. Cir. 1948), and Hickman v. Taylor et al., 329 U. S. 495, 67
S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947). The extent to which these decisions can be applied to the facts of the instant case is open to question.
While an impressive array of cases substantiate the view that the
rules governing depositions and discovery, FED. R. Civ. P. 26-34, are
to be liberally construed and applied, June v. George C. Peterson Co.,
155 F. (2d) 963 (7th Cir. 1946); Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. et al., 35 F. Supp. 949 (N. J. 1940); Welty v.
Clute, 29 F. Supp. 2 (W. D. N. Y. 1939); Brunn v. Hanson, 30 F.
Supp. 602 (Idaho 1939), it is generally accepted, as the court pointed
out in the instant case, that ".. . the requirement for ordering production only 'upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor,'
was not an idle phrase without significance. . . ." As was stated in
the Capital Transit case, on which the court in the instant case principally relied:
The rule contemplates an exercise of judgment by the court, not a
mere automatic granting of a motion. The court's judgment is to be
moved by a demonstration by the moving party of its need, for the pur-

poses of the trial, of the document or paper sought.
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The problem is, then, how far the petitioning party need go to establish good cause.
It is difficult to see how the requisite need was not established in
the instant case. It was not an attempt on the plaintiff's part to
indulge in a "fishing" expedition. The plaintiff sought to discover
the nature and extent of the admissions he made to the investigator
for the defendant's insurer, and since a cause of action had already
been stated in the pleadings, that could hardly be called a blind
casting for evidence. In the Capital Transit case, on the other hand,
no reason or necessity for production was advanced which the court
could weigh in determining whether good cause had been shown. In
the instant case, the plaintiff voiced his need in his claim that the
statement was signed before he was aided by counsel, and that he
was not certain of the nature of what he had signed. In the Capital
Transit case, the plaintiff, in asking for discovery of a motorman's
accident report, stated the following grounds:
In a deposition taken of said Mr. Davis [the motorman] . . . he
testified that he made a written report to the Capital Transit Company
immediately following the accident, pursuant to its standing rule that
accident reports be filed . . . that at said deposition demand was made
on behalf of the plaintiff for production . . . and that plaintiff gave
notice to the defendant at that time that appropriate steps by motion
would be taken to require its production. . . . [Martin v. Capital
Transit Co., 170 F. (2d) 811, 812 (D. C. Cir. 1948).]

This is a bare demand for discovery, and is not parallel to the petition
and argument considered by the court in the instant case.
The question here decided confronted a Supreme Court of New
York in La Maida v. Miledna Realty Corp., 182 Misc. 690, 49 N. Y.
S. (2d) 650, 651 (1944). There the court, in applying a similar provision, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 234, denied the motion for the reason
that the substance of the statement signed, if true, could be repeated
by the plaintiff in his testimony without fear of impeachment. But,
as the court reasoned, if the right to inspection were granted, "the
parties would thus be afforded an opportunity to so fashion their testimony in advance as to make cross-examination a meaningless proceeding." This decision was followed in Scavone v. Bush, 193 Misc.
268, 84 N. Y. S. (2d) 40 (1948).
Although the result reached in the instant case agrees with that
of the La Maida case, it is based, not upon the reasoning of the
New York court, but upon a supposed parallel with the facts of the
Capital Transit case. There was only one indication in the court's
opinion in the instant case that its decision might have been based
on other grounds. This was the answer given to the plaintiff's plea
that he needed discovery to ascertain any material difference in his
present conception of the facts and those he admitted in the statement. The court parried this contention with the statement that this
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argument is "implicit" in every motion to produce. This does not
face the problem squarely as did the New York court. Stated concisely, the question is, as the New York court approached it, whether
a plaintiff who has admitted facts in a signed statement (before he
was represented by counsel), and who cannot recall what he has
admitted, can succeed in a motion to produce for inspection before
trial. The New York court answered in the negative, one judge dissenting.
We have already seen that the federal rules are to be liberally
construed and applied. The only argument advanced against permitting discovery is that of the New York court, i.e., if the plaintiff
signed to the truth, he will remember it. But does not this view
assume that the plaintiff may be an opportunist who cannot untangle the
maze of his own fabrications? Why not as readily assume that his
forgetfulness is honest? The advantage to the defendant in preserving
the contents of the document in secrecy is in its impeachment value.
To forbid discovery before trial arms the defendant' with strategy,
not truth. The plaintiff must support his case with proof. This burden
wif not be lessened by discovery. In fact, by refusal to. grant the
motion, the synchronized movement of justice may be retarded through
surprise, necessity for new motions, and truth-concealing strategy. The
purpose of the federal rules has been concisely stated, "The new rules
were designed to .eliminate surprise and decisions which result from
strategy." Olson Transportation Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 7
F. R. D. 134, 136 (E. D. Wis. 1944). It is doubtful whether the strict
construction placed upon Rule 34 in the instant case furthers that
purpose.
Vincent C. A. Scully

PRACTICE OF LAw-UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE BY REAL ESTATE
BROKERS AND AGENTS.-People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assn. et- al.
v. Schafer, Ill..,
.... 87 N. E. (2d) 773 (1949). The Supreme Court
of Illinois has held that the preparation of blank forms by a real
estate broker, when it involves some discretion and advice, constitutes the unauthorized practice of law, even when incidental to the
legitimate functions of a licensed real estate broker, and particularly
when such services involve advice on the disposition of a client's estate.
The respondent was a licensed real estate and insurance broker
but had no license to practice law in the State of Illinois. As a part
of his regular business, he prepared deeds, contracts and mortgages
in real estate transactions in which he was the procuring agent and
for which he received a broker's commission. He also, as a regular
practice, prepared similar instruments in cases where he was not the
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procuring agent, and in such instances he made a charge for the
service. The respondent, upon being consulted by a client as to the
disposition of her estate, advised her that it was not necessary for
her to have a will, but that he could handle the disposition of her
real estate by execution of deeds, one of which would convey the
property to a "dummy" who would then convey the same property
by a separate deed to her and her daughter. The respondent prepared
the necessary deeds and they were executed by the respective grantors.
He held these instruments and a promissory note in accordance with
his client's instructions until after her death. A dispute arose about
the estate of the deceased client and the various deeds, which brought
the matter to the attention of an attorney.
In adjudging the respondent guilty of contempt for the unauthorized practice of law, the court pointed out that while the mere completion of a printed form did not of itself constitute the practice of
law, the rendering of any additional services was objectionable. As
the court stated:
When filling
in blanks as directed he may not by that simple act be
practicing law, but if he elicits -the proper information and considers it
and advises and acts thereon he would in all probability be practicing
law. In other words, if his service does not amount to the practice of
law it is without material value; but if it is of material value it would
likely amount to the practice of law.

The court in the instant case in reaching its decision drew upon
the case of People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282,
77 N. E. ('2d) 693 (1948), in which the respondent, a disbarred
attorney, while counseling two clients regarding their income tax,
discovered that they had formerly owned some real estate which was
handled by an agent who represented the purchaser and the seller.
He prepared a notice of rescission of an oral contract and warranty
deed, signing the papers for the parties as a real estate agent. He
was assuming the control of a matter for the grantors that involved
their legal and equitable rights in a piece of property. The respondent
counseled and advised the clients as to the course that they should
follow. The court, in holding that the respondent had engaged in
unauthorized practice, stated that the practice of law was not limited
to practice in courts of record, but included the giving of advice, counseling, drafting of legal documents, and the participation in transactions which were outside the scope of the actual litigation in the
courts.
There is a considerable amount of conflict as to whether the completing of forms, some of which may be contracts, deeds, etc., constitutes the practice of law. In In re Eastern Idaho Loan & T. Co.,
49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930), the court said that the clerical
labor of filling in blanks and stereotyped forms, when it involves no
legal determination, does not constitute the practice of law. In Gus-
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talson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E. (2d)
435 (1941), the court indicated some of the items that may properly
be supplied in various instruments by a real estate broker. The
supplying of simple, factual material, such as the date, the name of
the purchaser, the location of the property, the date of giving possession, and the duration of the offer, requires ordinary ability rather
than skill peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law.
A similar view was taken in In re Matthews, 58 Idaho 772, 79 P.
(2d) 535 (1938), in which the defendant, a public stenographer and
notary public, who was engaged in the abstract, insurance and real
estate business, was held to be not guilty of the practice of law when
he filled out forms of deeds, mortgages, contracts, leases and bills of
sale at the request of others, even though he had advertised "correct
legal conveyances." In an earlier case, In re Matthews, 57 Idaho 75,
62 P. (2d) 578 (1936), the defendant was held to be guilty of the
practice of law when he represented himself as qualified and learned
in the practice of law, particularly in matters connected with all types
of conveyancing and in the preparation of bills of sale, deeds, real
estate mortgages, chattel mortgages and the papers necessary in probate proceedings.
The fact that the papers are simple and not complex, and that
the blanks might be filled in by one not skilled in legal work has no
bearing on the determination of whether the accused is guilty of the
practice of law. This idea was enunciated in People v. Lawyers Title
Corporation, 282 N. Y. 513, 27 N. E. (2d) 30 (1940).
As Judge
Pound said in People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 366,
125 N. E. 666, 670 (1919): "I am unable to rest any satisfactory
test on the distinction between simple and complex instruments. The
most complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble
the inexperienced."
In other cases the courts have held that the completion of blank
forms amounted to the practice of law. In Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa.
9, 171 Atl. 883 (1934), the defendant, a stenographer and notary
public, was found guilty of the practice of law because she had filled
out certain blank forms. She had drawn a great variety of legal
instruments, including wills, deeds of trusts, bills of sale, leases, partnership agreements, deeds and mortgages. In a few instances the
defendant had placed in typewritten form instruments brought to her
already in writing, but in most instances she had used forms containing blanks which she filled out with appropriate language. Occasionally she drafted the papers without relying on printed forms.
This method of doing business was held to be the practice of law;
however, the court stated that it did not mean that real estate brokers
could not prepare the necessary papers pertaining to and growing out
of their business transactions and intimately connected therewith.
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There is some authority to the effect that the drawing of documents pertaining to real estate should constitute the practice of law
regardless of the fact that the drawing and preparation of such instruments are incidental to the various real estate transactions. The fact
that a real estate broker or a notary public makes a separate charge
for the drawing of such instruments or gives advice in relation to
these documents is an important reason for holding that such acts
constitute the practice of law. For instance, in Paul et al. v. Stanley,
168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401 (1932), the defendant, a notary
public, real estate agent and broker, was prohibited from drawing
simple deeds, mortgages, and other simple instruments. It was also
held to be the practice of law when legal advice was given in connection with the preparation of a legal instrument.
A similar conclusion was reached in People v. Sipper, 61 Cal. App.
(2d) 844, 142 P. (2d) 960 (1943), in which the defendant, a real
estate broker, was charged with giving advice on purchase money
mortgages to prospective purchasers. The court concluded that he
had been guilty of the unauthorized practice of law, but it did not
pass upon the right of a licensed real estate broker or salesman to
make out a deed as an incident to completion of a sale.
In the case of In re Gore, 58 Ohio App. 79, 15 N. E. (2d) 968
(1937), the defendant, a licensed real estate broker who drew up
contracts between the seller and the purchaser, but only when he
acted as a broker for one or the other, was held guilty of the unauthorized practice of law. He selected the appropriate printed form
for the transaction, and also prepared other instruments essential to
the consummation of the transaction, such as deeds, mortgages, land
contracts and leases. He filled in what he conceived to be the
proper substance to carry out the transaction, but made no direct
charge for the drafting, apart from the compensation he received as
a broker for closing the transaction.
It has been held, however, that the occasional drafting of simple
instruments does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law,
even when not strictly incidental to the real estate business. People
ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Jersin, 101 Colo. 406, 74 P. (2d) 668 (1937);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N. E. 313 (1935);
People v. Weil, 237 App. Div. 118, 260 N. Y. S. 658 (1932).
The problem of drawing legal instruments has plagued many types
of companies, particularly banks, title insurance companies and credit
collection agencies. There are several cases which hold that persons
or concerns may draft various legal instruments as an incident to
their regular business and yet not be guilty of the practice of law
if no legal advice is given. Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Boykin,
172 Ga. 437, 157 S. E. 455 (1931); Depew v. Wichita Ass'n. of Credit
Men, Inc., 142 Kan. 403, 49 P. (2d) 1041 (1935); Cowern v. Nelson,
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207 Minn. 642, 290 N. W. 795 (1940); Cain v. Merchants National
Bank & Trust Co., 66 N. D. 746, 268 N. W. 719 (1936); La Brum
v. Commonwealth Title Co. of Philadelphia, 368 Pa. 239, 56 A. (2d)
246 (1948). Contra: Clark et al. v. Reardon, 231 Mo. App. 666,
104 S. W. (2d) 407 (1937); Land Title Abstract & Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E. 650 (1934); Hexter Title &
Abstract Co. v. Grievance Committee, 142 Tex. 506, 179 S. W. (2d)
946 (1944); Stewart Abstract Co. v. Judicial Commission of Jefferson County, 131 S. W. (2d) 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
There is no doubt that the majority of the various decisions indicate
that the real estate agent or broker is practicing law when he draws
various legal instruments concerning the conveyancing of real estate.
The function of a real estate agent is to act as an intermediary between
a buyer and a seller, and that is the basis of his compensation. The
necessary legal documents, regardless of whether they are blank
forms or complex instruments, should be prepared by an attorney.
The purpose of restricting the field of operations of the real estate
broker or agent is to protect the public. If a real estate broker should
give improper counsel concerning real estate, he would not expose
himself to the professional discipline to which an attorney is subject.
The state statutes which require real estate brokers and agents to be
licensed by the state do not give the licensee authority to give advice
concerning matters that require legal knowledge or skill.
BernardL. Weddel

TORTS-RIGHT OF RECOVERY UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE

FoR FATAL PRENATAL INJURIES TO VIABLE INFANT.-Verkennes v.
Corniea et al., ... Minn-..,

38 N. W. (2d) 838 (1949).

In an action by

the special administrator of the estate of a deceased child against a defendant doctor and hospital for wrongful death, the plaintiff alleged
that the mother of the deceased child was taken to the defendant hospital for confinement and delivery, and that as a result of the negligence
of the defendants, both mother and child died. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The question of first impression in Minnesota
was:
. .. whether the special administrator of the estate of an unborn infant,
which dies prior to birth as the result of another's negligence, has a
cause of action on behalf of the next of kin of said unborn infant under
the wrongful death statute.

The court held that an action may be maintained by the personal representative of an unborn, viable child capable of separate and independent existence. The court said:
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It seems too plain for argument that where independent existence is
possible and life is destroyed through a wrongful act, a cause of action
arises under the statutes cited.

Until 1933, there was an almost unbroken line of both English
and American cases denying a right, apart from statute, to sue
for injuries received prior to birth resulting in physical disability:
Walker v. Great Northern Railroadof Ireland, 28 L. R. Ir. 69 (1890);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900);
Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N. E. (2d) 446 (1939);
Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co., 209 N. Y. 515, 102 N. E. 1107
(1913);

Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921);

Lipps v.Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.
W. 916 (1916); and wrongful death: Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Dietrich v.
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281
Mich. 60, 274 N. W. 710 (1937); Buel v. United Railways Co., 248
Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Gorman v, Budlong, 23 R. I. 169,
49 Atl. 704 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124
Tex. 347, 78 S.W. (2d) 944 (1935). The courts had justified their
decisions chiefly upon two grounds. First, the courts reasoned, an
unborn infant is not a person within the contemplation of the law.
Hence there could be no violation of a duty to exercise due care
when that duty never existed with regard to the child. This was
Justice Holmes' basic reasoning in the leading case of Dietrich v.Northampton, supra. Second, it would be impractical and difficult to
show proximate causation and to handle the flood of lawsuits based
on fictitious and fraudulent claims which would follow in the wake of
such a decision.
It is, therefore, ivorthy of note that many of the authorities cited in
the principal case seem to be based on the civil law, or on statutory
enactments of civil law concepts. Thus in a Louisiana case, Cooper
et al. v. Blanck, _-La. App .....
, 39 So. (2d) 352 (1923), in which re-

covery was granted, the court based its decision on the provisions of
the Louisiana code, LA. CIv. CODE ANN. Art. 2315 (1945), which gives

a right of action to parents for the loss of their child when due to another's negligent conduct. The court held that a viable unborn infant was a "child" within the meaning of the code provision.
A Canadian case upon which the court heavily relied, Montreal
Tramways Co. v.Leveille, [1933] 4 D. L. R. 337, 344, came to the
Supreme Court of Canada from Quebec, a civil law province. The
court in that case, in allowing a child to recover from injuries received
prior to birth, stated:
...
it is but natural justice that a child, if born alive and viable, should
be allowed to maintain an action in the Courts for injuries wrongfully
committed upon its person while in the womb of its mother.
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In California, a similar result was reached in a construction of the
California code, CAL. Crv. CODE § 29 (1946), which provides that a
child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person so
far as may be necessary for its interests. In so construing the statute,
the court expressly approved the dissenting opinion of Justice Boggs
in Alliare v. St. Luke's Hospital, supra. The court intimated, nevertheless, that apart from statute the action would not lie.
The only federal decision upon the problem, Bonbrest et al. v. Kotz
et al, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140, 141, 142 (W. D. Pa. 1946), viewed the
imposing line of decisions refusing to grant a cause of action, but adopted the minority view (the question being a novel one in that jurisdiction), saying:
... here we find a willingness to face the facts of life rather than a.
myopic and specious- resort to precedent to avoid attachment of responsibility where it ought to attach and to permit idiocy, imbecility,
paralysis, loss of function, and like residuals of another's negligence to be
locked up in the limbo of uncompensable wrong, because of a legal fiction, long outmoded.
And the court further stated:
From the viewpoint of the civil law and the law of property, a child
en ventre sa mere is not only regarded as (a] human being, but as such
from the moment of conception-which it is in fact. Why a "part"
of the mother under the law of negligence and a separate entity and
person in that of property and crime? . . . Why a human being, under
the civil law, and a non-entity under the Common Law?
In another recent decision, Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc.,
.. Ohio...., 87 N. E. (2d) 334, 340, 24 NOTRE DAmE LAwYER 409

(1949), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an existing viable child,
although unborn, is a person within a constitutional provision, Oio
CONST. Art. I, § 16, giving every "person" a remedy for injury done
him in his person, so as to permit the child after birth to bring an
action for personal injuries. The court stated that to hold that an
infant is not a living "person" until birth would:
. ..

in our view .. ..

deprive the infant of the right conferred by the

Constitution upon all persons, by the application of a time-worn fiction
not founded on fact and within common knowledge untrue and unjustified.
Thus in every case where relief has been granted, the injury was
inflicted upon a viable foetus, and it is worth noting that in the early
case of Dietrich v. Northampton, supra, where Justice Holmes denied
recovery-setting the precedent which the other courts were quite
willing to follow-the child was non-viable. A 1916 case which denied
recovery, Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272,
159 N. W. 916, 917 (1916), where a non-viable foetus was concerned,
specifically distinguished its ruling from the case where the wrong was
to a viable child, saying:
Very cogent reasons may be urged for a contrary rule where the infant
is viable and especially where the defendant, being a doctor or midwife,

